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Social and developmental psychologists have stressed the pervasiveness and strength of
humans’ tendencies to conform and to imitate, and social anthropologists have argued
that these tendencies are crucial to the formation of cultures. Research from four domains
is reviewed and elaborated to show that divergence is also pervasive and potent, and it
is interwoven with convergence in a complex set of dynamics that is often unnoticed or
minimized. First, classic research in social conformity is reinterpreted in terms of truth,
trust, and social solidarity, revealing that dissent is its most salient feature. Second, recent
studies of children’s use of testimony to guide action reveal a surprisingly sophisticated
balance of trust and prudence, and a concern for truth and charity. Third, new experiments
indicate that people diverge from others even under conditions where conformity seems
assured. Fourth, current studies of imitation provide strong evidence that children are
both selective and faithful in who, what, and why they follow others. All of the evidence
reviewed points toward children and adults as being engaged, embodied partners with
others, motivated to learn and understand the world, others, and themselves in ways
that go beyond goals and rules, prediction and control. Even young children act as if they
are in a dialogical relationship with others and the world, rather than acting as if they are
solo explorers or blind followers. Overall, the evidence supports the hypothesis that social
understanding cannot be reduced to convergence or divergence, but includes ongoing
activities that seek greater comprehensiveness and complexity in the ability to act and
interact effectively, appropriately, and with integrity.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the deepest assumptions of social psychology, and many
allied disciplines, is that people have strong tendencies to conform,
to imitate, to mimic, and to obey. These tendencies are claimed
as the basis for coordination, communication, and culture (e.g.,
Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Mesoudi, 2009). The available evi-
dence, though, reveals a far more complex and interesting set
of dynamics: divergence is as pervasive as convergence, but its
appearance is often unnoticed or minimized (Berger and Heath,
2008; Haslam and Reicher, 2012; Reicher et al., 2012; Hodges, in
press). The story that needs to be told, though, is not simply that
we need to pay more attention to divergence, but that we need to
appreciate a larger set of dynamics: social understanding cannot
be reduced to convergence or divergence.
Why have researchers and theorists been so slow to recog-
nize the importance of divergence, disagreement, diversity, and
dissent in the dynamics of social interaction? There are many
reasons, but chief among them are theoretical and method-
ological biases that focus on what might be called “Cartesian
individuals”—isolated individuals, separated from the world and
others, thinking about how to achieve egoistic goals (e.g., to be
accurate, to belong). From this perspective, others come to be
treated as means to individually determined ends, rather than
partners who must act together to learn and to care for each other
and the larger ecosystems of which they are a part. Cartesian
thinkers must either try (1) to infer what other isolated indi-
viduals are thinking or (2) to project their own thoughts onto
others, and simulate what they might do in their situation. The
ﬁrst possibility is chancy at best; social understanding becomes
a guessing game that is prey to the constant worry that one has
guessed wrong. The second possibility, which initially inspires
more conﬁdence, is based on a crucial assumption that the other
is similar to the self. The risk is that the assumption is pre-
sumptuous, that it hides real and important differences (Reddy,
2008).
The fascination of social psychologists with conformity and
other forms of convergence is a consequence of their having begun
their work with assumptions of individualism, independence, and
isolation (Shotter, 2001). Given these assumptions, it might seem
important to show how people inﬂuence each other, form com-
mon bonds, and productively pursue common goals. Divergence,
in contrast, would be seen as relatively uninteresting, since it is a
natural consequence of the independence and isolation of indi-
vidual thinkers. However, I will argue that social understanding is
more about embodied joint activity among people across time and
task than it is about one individual generating ideas about another
in order to predict and control outcomes. Rather than control-
ling outcomes, joint activities make participants more vulnerable
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to others, and more dependent on the environment; nevertheless,
it also increases the ﬂexibility and integrity of their actions and
choices.
An array of studies will be described indicating that people
act less like Cartesian thinkers and more like social, embodied,
dialogical partners, working together to learn how to act in ways
that are good for themselves and their ecosystems. The evidence
suggests that people aremotivated tounderstand situations, others,
and themselves, not simply to seek predetermined goals. Social
understanding, as it will be addressed in this article, is not about
trying to make the other like the self, or the self like the other,
but is about jointly exploring a more comprehensive and complex
ﬁeld of action than any of its participants could have predicted or
imagined alone.
The evidence to be presented comes primarily from studies
in developmental and social psychology, but it has implications
for studies in anthropology, language, learning, and many other
domains. The four topics that will be addressed are (1) reinter-
pretations of classic studies in conformity that shift the focus to
truth, trust, and social solidarity; (2) recent studies of the role
of testimony and trust in children’s actions and choices; (3) new
experiments showing that people do not always conform, even
when it is normatively expected; and (4) studies of imitation show-
ing that children are surprisingly selective and careful in their
following the lead of others. The evidence suggests that diver-
gence is as newsworthy as convergence, and that there is much yet
to learn about how these dynamics interact and play out in social
understanding.
THREE THEMES AND A HYPOTHESIS
Before the evidence itself is presented, three themes should be
noted—social understanding, embodiment, and intersubjectivity.
These are provided by the Research Topic (Towards an embodied
science of intersubjectivity: Widening the scope of social understand-
ing research) to which this article contributes. What I take those
terms to mean will become increasingly clear in the ways that I
make use of them, but it may help to sketch brieﬂy their potential
before delving into the details of divergence and convergence in
social interaction.
SOCIAL UNDERSTANDING
The working hypothesis explored in this paper comes from
research applying values-realizing theory to social cognition
(Hodges and Geyer, 2006; Hodges et al., 2014), perception–action
(e.g., Hodges and Lindhiem, 2006; Hodges, 2007b), language
(Hodges, 2007a, 2009), and developmental psychology (Hodges
and Baron, 1992; Hodges, in press). Values-realizing theory claims
that perception, action, and cognition are motivated by values,
including clarity, coherence, comprehensiveness, and complex-
ity (Hodges, 2009). The hypothesis is this: understanding is the
ongoing activity of seeking comprehensiveness and complex-
ity in our knowing and doing. While the values of clarity and
coherence point to the need to differentiate and organize our
experiences in meaningful ways, comprehensiveness and com-
plexity pull activity toward larger, differing contexts that lead
to continuities and discontinuities with prior experience. In an
important sense, understanding enlarges and complicates our
views and actions rather than satisfying and simplifying them.
More speciﬁcally, this hypothesis suggests that social understand-
ing is the ongoing activity of divergence, not just convergence,
of opening up new possibilities, not simply closing in on pre-
determined goals. Different people in different positions at
different times interacting on common ground provide the basis
for exploration, as well as a surer grasp of “this place and
time and our identity in it” than when one person guesses or
simulates.
EMBODIMENT
As Wilson and Golonka (2013, p. 1) have suggested, embodied
cognition is not the claim that bodies affect minds, but that skilled
(mindful) action is a distributed set of physical relationships over
time,“brain, body, and environment, coupled together via our per-
ceptual systems.”The examples to be consideredwill illustrate how
social understanding involvesmultiple bodies interacting together,
and how actions made by any one body are dependent on the pres-
ence, placement, and activity of other bodies over time. Following
the lead of another person (or not) is more than guessing or pro-
jecting. It is a search to ﬁnd the integrity of relationships, physical
and social; it is also a search for social solidarity and truth. If so,
how is that search carried out?
INTERSUBJECTIVITY
As the earlier discussion of Cartesian perspectives on social knowl-
edge suggested, intersubjectivity is usually taken to be the relation
among independent, disembodied minds. If, however, it is an
embodied social activity that pulls us beyond the common ground
on which we stand toward a richer appreciation of the larger envi-
ronment and the broader community within which we dwell, then
we have the beginnings of an alternative approach, what might
be called interaction theory (De Jaegher et al., 2010) or dialogical
theory (Linell, 2009). That is, the way in which we come to know
and understand others and ourselves is through engagement with
each other.
Engagement takes the situated community as fundamental.
There is no gap between individuals requiring a theory of or a
simulation of “other minds,” and there is no dispassionate obser-
vation of the world from a distance (Reddy, 2008). Rather, humans
interact with each other and their environment in variety of mean-
ingful ways, and in doing so they come to learn what the world
is, who others are, and who they themselves are. Perceiving one-
self, others, and the world are interwoven activities and may be
direct (rather than inferred), but only over time, and in ways
that require participants to be committed as embodied, engaged
presences (Gallagher, 2008; De Jaegher, 2009; De Jaegher et al.,
2010).
A central issue to be addressed in this paper is how the per-
ceptions and actions of others are integrated with one’s own
actions and perceptions, and how this is constrained by embod-
ied locations and speciﬁc social understandings. This integration
is necessary for learning and language to occur, and it emerges
from the values that make these activities possible (Hodges, 2009).
This interactive, dialogical, engaged way of enacting social under-
standing has been challenging, both theoretically and empirically,
for psychologists and other researchers to address adequately.
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Nevertheless, even traditional methods of investigation, which
focus on particular individuals, have revealed the social, ecological,
and dialogical nature of social understanding. Thus, we now turn
to how social understanding, embodiment, and intersubjectivity
emerge from studies on conformity, imitation, and trust.
DISSENTING FOR TRUTH
One of the most famous studies in social psychology is Asch’s
(1951, 1956) experimental dilemma in which he had confederates
answer clear factual questions about lengths of lines incorrectly
some of the time. Having heard the same wrong answer multiple
times, the real participant was in an awkward position: he could
say what he thought was false, or he could dissent from a unani-
mous majority. Asch’s work is the locus classicus for claims about
conformity among humans because people agreed with the con-
federates’ wrong answers about 1/3 of the time, far more often
than Asch expected. That is an impressive ﬁnding, but even more
impressive is how often a lone participant told the truth about
what he saw in the face of a unanimous consensus to the contrary.
Unfortunately, the former ﬁnding has attracted virtually all the
attention. Despite being the most cited reference to support the
power of conformity, Asch’s experiments are a powerful testament
to divergence (Hodges and Geyer, 2006). Participants disagreed
2/3 of the time with a 100% consensus, and 95% of the time with
a consensus over 80% (Asch, 1956).
What prompted this stunning display of dissent? The simple
answer is truth-telling: it was when the majority answered incor-
rectly that participants disagreed a large majority of the time. How
did a story of divergence turn into one of convergence? One crucial
reason is that the experiments are not framed in termsof pragmatic
actions,multiple relationships, and temporal dynamics, but rather
in terms of an isolated Cartesian knower guessing and worrying.
One explanation of Asch’s (1956) results assumes that individuals
in the experiment are confused by the misleading information and
are unsure what is correct, so they guess it best to follow the lead of
others. A second explanation claims that people realize what the
correct answer is, but worry that if they disagree with others, they
will be ostracized or embarrassed in some way; thus, in order to
be liked by others, they agree with their wrong answers (Campbell
and Fairey, 1989). Neither of these explanations actually explains
the data.
These accounts do not even try to explain all the data, but focus
only on incorrect, agreeing answers. This is startling on three
counts. First, they take accuracy and dissent to be obvious and
psychologically uninteresting. Second, they ignore the diversity of
responses to the situation, which ranged from never conforming
(26%) to conforming a majority of the time (28%). Third, they
completely overlook the most obvious group to describe, the typ-
ical participants (the middle 46%), who dissent nine times and
agree three times (i.e., the median) on critical trials (Hodges and
Geyer, 2006). If Asch’s participants were worried about being liked
or being correct, whywould they have disagreed so often, or agreed
so little?
ENGAGEMENT, EMBODIMENT, AND UNDERSTANDING
Hodges and Geyer (2006) proposed a new approach to under-
standing the Asch dilemma that attempts to address weaknesses
of earlier interpretations. First, they suggested that Asch’s partic-
ipants were mostly neither the cowardly conformists that many
social psychologists have portrayed, nor the independent truth-
tellersAschwas looking for; rather, theywere ecologically sensitive,
pragmatically astute individualswhowere trying to be truthful and
cooperative in a complex and awkward situation.
Second, Hodges and Geyer (2006) argued that there are mul-
tiple values—truth, trust, and social solidarity—that properly
constrain Asch’s participants. As Asch (1990) realized, truth mat-
ters to people, and he chided his social psychological colleagues
for not acknowledging this fundamental fact. On the other hand,
he saw the social inﬂuence of consensus as a danger (Asch, 1952).
Despite Asch’s reservations, trusting others and expressing social
solidarity are not wrong: without them, the recognition and
expression of truth itself would be hampered (Campbell, 1990).
Asch’s situation is not a simple choice between good and bad,
between truth-telling and cowardice, but a delicate task of coor-
dination: how can a participant speak truthfully in a way that
honors his/her own view, that respects the views of others, and
that answers appropriately to the experimenter?
Third, to pull off this coordination Hodges and Geyer (2006)
hypothesized that many participants are engaging others in a
nuanced, respectful way, varying their answers over trials rather
than being trapped by an all-or-nothing choice. The 9/3 dis-
agree/agree pattern of typical participants indicates clearly and
truthfully their dissent from the consensus, yet it also respectfully
acknowledges that consensus by repeating it occasionally. Hodges
and Geyer (2006) claim that participants make local errors in
an attempt to express a larger truth; that is, that they are in an
awkward, frustrating situation in which there are tensions among
multiple obligations. Although participants appear to be incon-
sistent, it is more likely that they are working to realize multiple
values that are in tension. Almost certainly this is not a conscious
strategy, but rather a product of a continuously evolvingdynamical
system in which prior choices constrain current ones (cf., Thelen
et al., 2001).
Fourth, intersubjectivity appears in the Asch (1956) studies
in the pragmatics of the quasi-conversation that the experiment
is. Hodges and Geyer (2006) suggest that Asch’s account is not
sufﬁciently sensitive to participants’ multiple obligations and to
the conversational nature of the interaction among the real par-
ticipant, their peers, and the experimenter. If a person always
dissented from a group’s expressed views (i.e., what Asch hoped
would happen), it would be easy for that person to be seen as
arrogant or dismissive. If, on the other hand, one agrees some
of the time with incorrect answers, it functions as a pragmatic
signal of one’s commitment to taking others’ views seriously
(i.e., social solidarity) and one’s openness to further engage-
ment (i.e., trust) in the strange situation in which they ﬁnd
themselves.
Fifth, social solidarity must be maintained if one is to be taken
as a serious witness to the truth of matters. If there is a lack of
trust between parties, truth telling becomes much more delicate
anddifﬁcult. Dissent cannot function if it is directed towardpeople
who do not care what others think, or if there is no concern for
those to whom the dissent is addressed. Dissent implicitly appeals
to some sense of shared concern for truth and other values that
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provide the common ground for communicative discourse and
social interaction.
Sixth, regarding embodiment, there is some evidence that it
matters that participants are physically present and confronting
each other aswell as the experimenter. Attempts that soon followed
Asch (1951) tried to isolate the participant in a literal Cartesian
room to see how virtual group members (simulated by the exper-
imenter) would create the social pressure that was assumed to
produceAsch’s results. TheCrutchﬁeld (1955) procedure generally
yields less agreement withwrong answers (Bond and Smith, 1996).
This suggests that the physical–moral presence of otherswho speak
to the participant, and the participant to them, contributes to the
nature of the dilemma itself, as well as to the common ground
necessary to address it.
To summarize, Asch’s (1956) participants were not simply fac-
ing an epistemic quandary, aboutwhich theymight guess orworry.
Rather they were in a social-moral dilemma: what does one say in
a frustrating situation, when one is facing two bad choices, either
to speak truthfully and forcefully, but in a way that risks being
perceived as disrespectful, or to speak with greater tact and humil-
ity, but at the risk of denying one’s own convictions. Both of
these options were chosen, but far more often Asch’s participants
varieddissents and agreements over time. Thus, dynamics of diver-
gence and convergence were intertwined, revealing an embodied
engagement with others that worked to honor truth, while also
being sensitive to multiple relationships and multiple obligations.
The hope of participants seems to be that if they say what they
see, but also take account of others, perhaps together they can
learn what kind of situation they are in and what to make of
their disagreement. Engagement and dialogical interaction seek
social understanding (i.e., a larger, richer appreciation of one-
self, others, and the setting), rather than simply predicting or
projecting.
TRUST AND GUIDANCE
If there is any place where we expect to ﬁnd widespread tendencies
to follow the lead of others and to conform to observed prac-
tices, it is among children. What patterns of convergence and
divergence have emerged in studies of social development? Young
children—widely believed to be gullible conformists by some, and
independent investigators by others—show surprising sophistica-
tion in terms of evaluating the worth of others’ testimony about
events in the world (Kuczynski and Hildebrandt, 1997; Harris,
2012). As is true of adults, children take account of their own
perceptual experience of events and possibilities, but they also are
guided by the perceptions and actions of others. Their actions
and choices suggest they have social understanding, founded in
embodied interactivity with others over time.
Recent research indicates that children’s epistemic judgments
reveal both more vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010) and more trust
(Harris, 2012) than developmental psychologists generally have
been willing to grant. For example, children trust those who have
shown themselves reliable in the past, but they are not indiscrimi-
nate in that trust. If themore reliable informant is in a bad position
to see the relevant information, children tend to trust a less reli-
able but better positioned informant (Corriveau and Harris, 2009;
Brosseau-Liard and Birch, 2011). They even seem to operate on a
principle of charity: they are willing to learn from an informant
who had previously been incorrect, if the informant’s position had
prevented him or her from seeing the relevant information. How-
ever, they discount information from someone who previously
had been in a good position but was inaccurate (Nurmsoo and
Robinson, 2009).
Children tend to choose other children to learn the affor-
dances of novel toys, but they prefer adults as the best sources
for names of new objects. In short, they respect the relevance of
interactivity: they prefer to use guides more likely to have had rel-
evant experience (e.g., VanderBorght and Jaswal, 2009; Rakoczy
et al., 2010; Sobel and Corriveau, 2010; Koenig and Jaswal, 2011).
They show a preference for ﬁrst-hand testimony over second-hand
evidence (Einav and Robinson, 2011), and they also show a pref-
erence for information that is consensually agreed upon by several
adult witnesses, compared to a dissenter’s claim (Corriveau et al.,
2009). However, if an adult makes a claim that contradicts the
child’s own direct experience, children tend to question or cor-
rect the adult, rather than accepting the adult’s mistaken claim
(Koenig and Echols, 2003). If multiple adults make false state-
ments (e.g., about the color of toy), most children state the correct
color, but a minority follows the lead of the adults (Clément et al.,
2004).
Two recent studies worked out versions of an Asch (1951)
dilemma to present to 3 to 4-year-old children, one with a consen-
sus of peers (Haun andTomasello, 2011), andonewith a consensus
of adults (Corriveau and Harris, 2010). Their most stunning ﬁnd-
ing was how often children dissented from unanimous majorities:
for example, 76% of 4 year olds and 58% of 3 year olds answered
correctly every time in Corriveau and Harris (2010). In this same
study, children increasingly dissented from incorrect majorities
over succeeding answers, and when some clear, relevant good was
at stake, they never agreed with incorrect adults (i.e., the child
could win a prize, if they picked a bridge of the right length to
cross a river in a game). This is dramatic evidence that children
trust their own eyes, and are willing to disagree with a consensus
of adults who answer incorrectly. On the other hand, they also
show sensitivity to social consensus, at least when decisions do not
appear particularly consequential.
One feature, related to embodiment is noteworthy. Corriveau
and Harris used videotaped adults as their majority. Haun and
Tomasello (2011) believed that stronger evidence of conformity
in children could be found if there was face-to-face contact, and
if the others involved were age-peers, not adults. They devised a
procedure with four children, each looking at a book that pre-
sumably was the same for all; however, one child’s book differed
on selected pages. They found somewhat more conformity than
Corriveau and Harris did (about 34%), but otherwise the pic-
ture that emerges is almost identical. Haun and Tomasello refer
to the willingness to say things publicly that one does not ﬁnd
personally convincing “strong conformity” and they claim their
experiments show children do this. However, the studies provide
far more compelling evidence for children’s clarity and convic-
tion. Children, like adults, appear to be truth-tellers who are
sensitive both to the information value of others’ claims and
to the pragmatic complexities of dissent and agreement with
others.
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Other evidence fromdevelopmental studies also yields the same
pattern of cooperative engagement with others, but a strong ten-
dency of children to trust their own perception-action capabilities.
For example, when children are deciding whether to step across a
gap in their surface of support that is sufﬁciently wide and deep
that they hesitate, they often look to a parent for clariﬁcation,
to see if they are smiling, frowning, or looking uncertain. What
happens when the child perceives that the gap is crossable, but
the parent discourages the action? Individual differences are con-
siderable, but most children take the step, as if they were saying,
“Mother knows best, but sometimes I know better” (Feinman,
1992, p. 252). Other studies using multiple sources of information
have found that children generally look to knowledgeable sources
more than attractive ones to clarify the situation. Children con-
fronted by an unexplained object in the room look more readily
at a stranger who appears conﬁdent about the object’s meaning
rather than looking at a more familiar and attractive person (e.g.,
their mother) who appears puzzled (Feinman, 1992).
Research on children’s reactions to parental commands and
instructions (Kuczynski and Kochanska, 1990; Kuczynski and
Hildebrandt, 1997) indicates that children generally are cooper-
ative, but they also engage in a number of actions that exhibit
their own agency (e.g., complaining, arguing, partial compli-
ance). Matas et al. (1978, p. 554) argued that “the competent
2-year-old . . . is not the child who automatically complies . . .
when requested to stop playing and clean up the toys, but who
gradually cooperates with the mother.” Overall, children care
about truth, not just approval, and engage in more dissent than
is generally appreciated. Furthermore, their concern for truth
and dissent is not so much a denial of their involvement in
social relationships, as it is a sign of their commitment to them
(Kuczynski and Hildebrandt, 1997). Reddy (1991, p. 144) pro-
vides evidence that this paradox of commitment and divergence
begins prior to the end of the ﬁrst year, when children initi-
ate opposition to caretakers’ actions and directives in a manner
that can only be described as teasing. She observes that teasing
is not so much a particular pattern of action but “is an ele-
ment in a relationship,” one that can bring its members closer
together.
Overall, the picture that emerges from studies of children’s
trust in and use of testimony and advice from others suggests a
developing sophistication that is surprisingly comprehensive and
complex. Mostly children pay attention to embodied interactions
of others and their likelihood of having observed or encountered
relevant information. They do not seem to be guessing or project-
ing primarily, but interacting and acting in ways that are engaged,
trusting, and vigilant. Even young children have a remarkably sub-
tle understanding of relationships, timing, location, and how to
ﬁnd integrity. For themost part, children appear to act as dialogical
partners, rather than blind followers or solo explorers.
SPEAKING FROM IGNORANCE
It is often assumed that children are in a position of ignorance,
in need of guidance from adults and older children to direct their
efforts. As the research just reviewed indicates, children seem to
share that conviction, but they also show a surprising conﬁdence
in their own abilities to see and know, and considerable ﬂexibility
in how they integrate their own perspectives with those of various
others. Acting from ignorance, however, is not conﬁned to chil-
dren. Adults are learners too, and they often ﬁnd themselves in a
position of ignorance with respect to others who know more. Do
they trust and follow others’ lead, or do they ignore others and
follow their own counsel?
Hodges et al. (2014) explored this question by placing people
in different positions relative to a screen so that two (A and B)
could see information clearly, and one (C) could not. Further-
more, participants at C could easily see that A and B were better
positioned than they were. They were then asked about informa-
tion projected on the screen (e.g., superimposed words embedded
in patterns). On critical trials participants at C had no deﬁnitive
information with which to answer independently (e.g., they could
see isolated letters but not the particular word about which they
were questioned). However, they heard two other people (A and
B) conﬁdently give the correct answer before it was their turn.
Asch was surprised that people ever agreed with others’ wrong
answers. In contrast, the Hodges et al. (2014) experiment inverts
the Asch situation: agreeing with others’ answers appears to be
the only sensible thing to do. However, Hodges et al. (2014)
predicted that participants would surprisingly often violate this
expectation: they would make up their own, incorrect answers
rather than repeating the correct answer given by A and B. This
disagreeing with wrong answers, which they called the speaking-
from-ignorance (SFI) effect, occurred about 30% of the time in
several experiments. Further evidence indicated that participants
were knowingly choosing not to agree with answers they believed
were correct.
This result seems quite implausible at ﬁrst. Unlike the Asch sit-
uation where there is a contradiction between perspectives, there
is no contradiction in the SFI situation; thus, it seems there should
be no dilemma. However, Hodges et al. (2014) found that par-
ticipants do experience the situation as a dilemma. The reasons
they do can be framed in terms of intersubjective engagement
and embodiment. If the SFI situation, like the Asch situation is
seen as a sort of conversation, then pragmatic constraints come
into play. Pragmatic cooperativeness usually entails saying nei-
ther what you believe to be false, nor that for which you lack
adequate evidence (Grice, 1975). However, an SFI situation pulls
and twists these two aspects of cooperation inside out, creating
a frustrating tension. While it is perfectly possible and appro-
priate to repeat what other, better-informed people have told
you—it seems a simple matter of trust—many participants feel
it is not quite right. “It feels like it’s cheating,” is the way some
expressed it. The embodied location of each of the participants
and the timing of their answers matters, and many participants
feel a sense of obligation to be true to their position, as well
as to the timing of their answer. Answering last affords them
the option of answering correctly with considerable conﬁdence,
and about 50% of all participants always do so. However, their
embodied position makes this awkward. The SFI effect reveals
an understanding of the situation that is truthful and prag-
matic: I cannot see from my position, so it is difﬁcult for me
to answer correctly and to do so with pragmatic warrant. This
understanding of the situation, both in terms of dialogical rela-
tionships and in terms of embodied locations, constrains many
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 726 | 5
Hodges Divergence, convergence, social understanding
participants to go beyond immediate tendencies to “be correct” or
“be agreeable.”
Hodges et al. (2014) propose that the same dynamics at work
in the Asch situation are also at work in the SFI situation—truth,
social solidarity, and trust. Answering incorrectly, and disagree-
ing with better informed others, may seem irrational, but doing
so truthfully acknowledges one’s ignorance, concretely expressing
one’s commitment to truthfulness, not simply to being correct.
It is also an expression of vulnerability and therefore it indicates
trust in others’ ability and willingness to appreciate the awkward-
ness of one’s position and to continue to share their knowledge.
Although social solidarity generally leads toward agreement, it
goes beyond uniformity and consensus: it encourages each par-
ticipant in a group to make his or her unique contribution to
the integrity and well being of the group as a whole. Thus, at
the level of conversational pragmatics, social solidarity leads each
participant to want to make a distinctive contribution to the con-
versation, rather than blindly repeating what others have said.
It is not wrong, of course, to repeat others when one is in a
position of ignorance. For example, we generally expect stu-
dents to repeat what their teachers tell them. However, we also
expect students to offer their own answers, even when those
answers are awkward or incorrect, an every day exemplar of an
SFI effect.
To test the hypothesis that pragmatic constraints to speak
truthfully and with epistemic warrant lead participants to dis-
agree with correct answers sometimes, Hodges et al. (2014,
Experiment 3) compared groups, one of which was primed
to be particularly sensitive to the demands of honesty. Even
though participants were given the opportunity of winning a
monetary prize by answering correctly, 49% of the time par-
ticipants in the honesty-prime condition chose not to agree
with correct answers given by others, compared to 19% in the
no-prime condition. Along with other ﬁndings of other experi-
ments, the results suggest that observed incorrect, non-agreeing
answers were “not a speaking-last effect, a speaking-from-a-
different-position effect, a speaking-to-differentiate [oneself from
others] effect, or a self-presentation effect (e.g., drawing atten-
tion to oneself as unique or creative)” (Hodges et al., 2014,
p. 228). Rather, it is a speaking-from-ignorance effect that is
yielded by the dynamics of truth, trust, and social solidar-
ity.
Engagement in the SFI situation requires attending to embod-
ied selves. Participants can see others are better positioned than
they themselves are, yet they donot always agree because they sense
a responsibility to their own physical, social, and moral location in
the experimental setup. Answers reﬂect the layout of the situation
as a whole, and the interdependence among positions, not simply
a choice of one perspective or another. Even when participants
gave agreeing answers, which they did most of the time, many par-
ticipants exhibited (as informally observed by the author) bodily
tension when they were giving correct, agreeing answers (e.g., they
lowered their voice as if embarrassed, they jiggled their pencil,
they hesitated, they tried to sound like they were saying some-
thing novel rather than repeating others). Most likely, this tension
emerged because they were aware that their position both did and
did not warrant their correctness.
To appreciate how social understanding is operative in the SFI
effect, one needs to think of social learning at the communal and
historical levels. What is necessary for cultures to function effec-
tively in terms of learning and sharing knowledge? Much attention
has been paid of late to the importance of agreement, conformity,
and faithful replication in the constituting of cultures (Richerson
and Boyd, 2005; Mesoudi, 2009). However, there is also a need
for innovation, creativity, and the ability to share and elaborate
those discoveries. Cultures necessarily embody a tension between
sharing common practices (i.e., homogeneity) and the production
of new variations (i.e., heterogeneity) from which better tools and
skills can emerge (Hodges, in press).
The SFI experiments suggest that it is better if not everyone
agrees with expert opinion or the consensus judgment, at least all
the time. The general wisdom embodied in this tendency is that
it may be better not to follow others blindly, even if they seem
to be in the position of the expert. Scientists are often annoyed
when others do not follow their lead, but there is good reason for
people to be cautious. People know things are more complicated
than even experts can appreciate, and they know that science itself
depends on people willing to challenge the consensus and to pro-
pose ideas thatmay seem crazy or impossible, at least at ﬁrst. In any
event the SFI effect shows that people’s use of others’ testimony is
not simply a goal-driven, rule-following activity, but engages the
dynamic interplay of divergence and convergence to realize values
that may be more complex and further aﬁeld than answering the
next question correctly.
SELECTIVE, FAITHFUL IMITATION
Imitation, “matching the behavior of a model after observing it”
(Over and Carpenter, 2012, p. 183), is a kind of conformity,
although it is rarely treated as such. Themain difference is whether
a group or an individual is being imitated. One of the most basic
facts of imitation, although often overlooked, is that it is selec-
tive: who and what is copied, when and how, are basic questions.
Behind these questions is a still deeper one: why does imitation
occur?
WHAT IS IMITATED AND HOW?
Despite the intentional character of imitation, Horowitz (2003)
has argued that what counts as imitation is vague. She stud-
ied chimpanzees and adult humans and found that both tended
to copy a complex series of actions partially. Both noticed eas-
ier ways to solve the puzzle she presented, so that even adult
humans who explicitly claimed to be imitating exactly failed to
do so. A crucial issue is that it is experimenters who decide
what is to count as relevant to the action to be imitated. Must
the one imitating use the same hand as the model, use the yel-
low ball rather than blue ball, and so on, for it to be counted
as matching the model? The relevance question is, of course,
one of the most challenging in psychology. Deciding what is
relevant demands a larger context of history, function, and pur-
pose; it raises the question of why imitation exists and what
it does in the larger scheme of things. One of the most active
discussions among researchers in this regard is whether imi-
tation is primarily a way of learning from others about the
world, or whether its focus is more on developing relationships
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(i.e., identifying or communicating with the model; Over and
Carpenter, 2013).
Tomasello (1999) claimed that children imitate much more
faithfully than chimpanzees, and subsequent work has substanti-
ated that children are far more likely to copy causally irrelevant
actions performed by an adult model in solving a puzzle (e.g., get-
ting a piece of food) than chimpanzees who choose more efﬁcient
means of solving the puzzle (Whiten et al., 2009). While this has
led some social anthropologists to refer to children’s close copying
as over-imitation (Lyons et al., 2007), implying that it is excessive
or “blinkered” (Whiten et al., 2009, p. 2425), others have taken a
far more positive view of the tendency, considering it faithful or
high ﬁdelity imitation (Nielsen and Blank, 2011; Over and Car-
penter, 2012). The latter have seen it as contributing to the human
propensity to transmit cultural patterns faithfully, allowing those
patterns to spread and survive (Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Nielsen
and Tomaselli, 2010).
How are children’s imitative actions both selective and faith-
ful? How and why do children sometimes imitate quite precisely
and other times much more selectively? These are central ques-
tions now being addressed by researchers, and how they should be
answered are matters of ongoing discussion and debate (Nielsen
and Blank, 2011; Over and Carpenter, 2012)? I will not try
to resolve all the difﬁculties, but it is interesting that imitation
researchers are now appealing to social psychology and its views
of conformity and mimicry to argue their cases (e.g., Over and
Carpenter, 2013). Perhaps, the more complex views of trust and
prudence, of agreement and dissent, discussed earlier can provide
fresh perspectives on imitation as well.
The possibility explored in this section is that children’s imi-
tative acts are seeking understanding, rather than simply being
acts of learning or acts of afﬁliation. I will argue that imitative
actions are selective and faithful, not one or the other, but they
also go beyond what these two terms suggest. A powerful exem-
plar of this claim is that children tend to copy intentional actions
of others, but not others’mistakes or their failed attempts. If adult
models begin but do not complete an action (e.g., pulling a top
off), children tend to complete the action they saw partially done
(Meltzoff, 1995; Nielsen, 2009). If they hear a puppet make a
mistake in saying a sentence, repeating a word that is unneces-
sary, they tend to omit the word when they repeat the sentence
(Over and Gattis, 2010). Children’s perception of agency appears
to be crucial: if the action is “modeled” by a machine or an inani-
mate toy, they imitate its movements more literally and less often.
This replication of intention rather than repetition of observed
action, which begins in the ﬁrst year (Nielsen, 2009), indicates
that what is being matched is ecological and prospective. It sug-
gests that what motivates imitation is larger than simply learning
about things, or simply afﬁliating with the model who has served
as demonstrator.
WHEN DOES IMITATION OCCUR?
There are a variety of conditions that affect the selectivity and
faithfulness of imitative precision and completeness. One is the
transparency of intentions. If an adult turns on a light switch with
her head instead of her hands, children will imitate her action,
but only if the adult’s hands are empty. If the adult’s hands are
occupied, then the children imitate turning on the light, but they
do it with their hands (Gergely et al., 2002), illustrating both selec-
tivity and faithfulness. More generally, children tend to imitate
less faithfully in tasks that have a clear goal (e.g., extracting a prize
from a puzzle box): they tend to omit extra motions and actions
that do not contribute directly to extracting the prize (Horner
and Whiten, 2005; Kenward et al., 2011). However, if the causal
mechanisms of the puzzle are opaque, then the model’s move-
ments are followed more closely (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007). Thus,
a second condition constraining selectivity is the transparency
of the goal and the means of its achievement. A third trend
is the increasing faithfulness of replication as children become
older. In fact, adults sometimes imitate more completely and
accurately than children: with no instructions to imitate adults
imitated more than 5 and 3 year olds, and the older children
included more causally irrelevant actions than the younger ones
did (McGuigan et al., 2011). Fourth, children who are uncer-
tain about how to solve a problem, or who have tried previously
and failed at a task, tend to copy a model’s actions much more
faithfully than if they have not had difﬁculty (Williamson et al.,
2008). Fifth, children who have been primed with social exclu-
sion tend to imitate models more closely (Over and Carpenter,
2009).
Finally, there are two other situations that tend to yield more
faithful imitation by children. One is when adults signal that they
are intending to teach the child (Brugger et al., 2007; Bonawitz
et al., 2011), and the other is when models demonstrate com-
petence rather than ineptness (DiYanni and Kelemen, 2008). If
children see an adult demonstrate a puzzle solution several times,
they tend to imitate the demonstrator’s actions, even if those
actionsdonot appear tobenecessary, but onlywhen that particular
demonstrator is present (Nielsen and Blank, 2011). This tendency
of the child to take into account a demonstrator’s particular way of
achieving an outcome, rather than simply taking the shortest,most
direct route to an outcome, is one that Nielsen and Blank argue
is important for the development of cultural groups, including
their diversity and richness. Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010) suggest
that this tendency to attend to particular cultural ways of doing
tasks appears in all kinds of cultures, and leads children (and later,
adults) to engage in actions that may interfere with what they as
individuals might desire or believe. They claim that this tendency
to follow others’ lead is neither blind nor maladaptive. Rather, it
is a mark of humans’ tendency to trust others to alert them to
complexities of physical causality that are not easily observed, as
well as helping to enhance social solidarity with other members of
their culture.
These last two factors affecting faithfulness lead us to notice
more carefully the question of who the model is in relation to the
child. Are some models imitated more than others?
WHO IS IMITATED?
Human infants and children tend to choose as models those
who have imitated them (Over et al., 2013), who are warm and
friendly (Nielsen, 2006), who have acted reliably in the past
(Clément et al., 2004), and who are ingroup members (i.e., use
child’s native language rather than another; Kinzler et al., 2011).
Perhaps, the broadest pattern that emerges is that embodied
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engagement, and dialogical interactivity leads to greater imitation.
Children are more likely to imitate faithfully if there is intersub-
jective engagement of adult and child prior to the demonstration
that will serve as the test of imitation. Imitation is increased if the
adult plays with the child prior to the test, or talks with them, and if
the child is particularly tuned to interacting with others (Nielsen,
2006; Brugger et al., 2007; Hillbrink et al., 2013). In fact, one way a
child and an adult can interactwith each other is imitating together
(Nielsen et al., 2013).
The increased imitation is tied to the speciﬁc individualwhohas
engaged and interacted with the child previously or in the larger
context in which the imitation task per se is embedded (Yu and
Kushnir, 2014). Embodiment, as well as speciﬁcity, matters: imi-
tation occurs markedly less when videotaped demonstrators are
presented rather than live demonstrators (McGuigan et al., 2007;
Nielsen et al., 2008). Thus, intersubjective engagement seems to
encourage imitative behavior, and it is not due to some general
increase in arousal, attention, or receptivity. The engagement is
dialogical, concerted, and embodied: children imitate with others,
not simply as a response to an action or a movement, but as a
dialogical activity with a particular other person with whom they
are engaged socially and physically.
The large-scale picture that emerges from these studies is that
children do not simply converge with those whom they observe,
nor do they diverge as if alienated. Children have a natural afﬁnity
for convergence, but not with just anyone, or anything, or under
any circumstance. They seem to be attuned to others that care
about them, and to those situations in which there is something
to learn and something to share.
WHY DOES IMITATION OCCUR?
One possibility, still widely taken for granted, is that imitation
in infants and young children is some hard-wired tendency to
repeat what they observe, and should not be taken as intentional
action (Lyons et al.,2007). All the evidence reviewedabove suggests
otherwise. Imitation is far too selective and varies too much in its
ﬁdelity to be some form of automatic motor mimicry (if such
a thing exists at all). Over and Carpenter (2012) proposed that
imitation is motivated in three ways. First, children are motivated
to learn about the world, and to use others to do so. Second,
they are also motivated to identify with the person being imitated
and the larger social activities they embody. Third, children are
sensitive to social pressures that encourageparticularways of doing
things. It is the latter two conditions, they propose, that encourage
more speciﬁc, detailed, and complete copying. Finally, they claim
that no existing theory of imitation does a good job of accounting
for existing evidence along these three motivational axes.
The challenges to imitation researchers go even deeper, though,
than Over and Carpenter’s (2012) critique. Consider, for example,
two recent experiments. Buttelmann et al. (2013), as well asYu and
Kushnir (2014), ﬁnd a substantial number of children, sometimes
a majority, who do not choose to follow either of two models
that are presented, or who engage in an action other than the two
options in which the experimenter was interested. For example,
14-month-old children watch a model, who has previously spoken
either German (the child’s language) or Russian to them, turn a
light on with his head. There is more imitation of the German
speaker’s action, but an even more interesting ﬁnding is that a
majority of children do not imitate either speaker, but turn the
light on in their ownway, usuallywith their hands.Whenpresented
with a model that chose one of two objects and acted pleased with
his choice, children later showed no preference for the model’s
choice in making their own choice. These results seem similar to
the frequent ﬁnding in social anthropology and psychology that
people tend to trust their own judgments and experience (Eriksson
andCoultas,2009; Eriksson andStrimling,2009;Hodges, in press),
and do not follow too readily the lead of others. The irony is
that it is procedures and choices of just the sort these two studies
consider that are assumed to be most vulnerable to conformity
effects.
SEEKING UNDERSTANDING IN IMITATION
Bråten (2000),Nagy (2006), andReddy (2008) outline a larger con-
text for understanding imitation, suggesting that it is a primitive
dialog, not simply a conduit for passing on expertise, as cultural
anthropologists often treat it. Infants initiate actions in an appar-
ent attempt to provoke parents into reacting. These provocations
are marked by heart deceleration (symptomatic of anticipation),
unlike imitative responses, which show heart acceleration (Nagy
and Molnar, 2004). The child and the adult see the other as caring
what the other does, and as being open to what the other has to
offer. Infants are sensitive to whether others are looking at them
or away, and prefer direct visual engagement (Farroni et al., 2002;
Rigato et al., 2011). Adult and child have to sense an openness and
obligation to each other that is emotional, that indicates“I take you
the way you are” and that anticipates what the other might do next
(Bråten, 2009). It is this promise of learning together that encour-
ages people to conform to parents, teachers, and colleagues, as well
as to challenge and test them in a dialog that appears to begin even
before children can speak (Meltzoff and Williamson, 2010).
There is a newfound appreciation among imitation researchers
for its social nature (e.g., Over and Carpenter, 2013). However, it
appears that they have slipped into the same sorts of dichotomies
that befuddle standard explanations of conformity in social psy-
chology (Hodges et al., 2014). One explanation given for faithful
imitation in children is that they are predisposed to see any pur-
poseful action by adults as causally relevant (Lyons et al., 2007;
Whiten et al., 2009). Another explanation is that faithful imita-
tion arises from children’s increasing sensitivity to cultural norms
and their desire to learn the socially approved way to do things
(Kenward, 2012). The former is similar to what Deutsch and
Gerard (1955) called informational inﬂuence (i.e., we conform
in order to be correct), and the latter is similar to normative
inﬂuence (i.e., we conform in order to belong and be liked).
However, aswas true in the case of conformity, this dichotomy can-
not capture the subtlety and sophistication of children’s selective
faithfulness.
It appears that children are trying to be faithful to more than
norms or causes. Bannard et al. (2013) claim that children act in
ways that are precocious, as if they can do more and know more
than they are able to achieve and complete. Perhaps, imitation by
children is not simply about copying what exists, but more about
trying to explore what is promising in the actions of other people
and in the events of their environment. The intentional activities
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of children appear to be exploring something larger and more
complex than physical causality and social identity. Hillbrink et al.
(2013) suggest that we should look at imitation, not just as an
instrumental act, but also as a communicative act that involves
reﬂection on the signiﬁcance and values of others. If, however,
values are not personal and social preferences, but are rather the
“global constraints on an ecosystem” (Hodges and Baron, 1992;
Hodges, 2007a, 2009), it may be that imitation is a precocious
search for the integrity of those ecosystems as a whole.
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING, DIALOG, AND SURPRISE
All of the phenomena explored in this paper—the Asch effect,
social reference effects (i.e., children seeking and using informa-
tion from others), the speaking from ignorance effect, and imita-
tion effects—yield the same fascinating and deep pattern. People
seek and respond in ways that show their propensity for truthful
information, for effective action, for social appropriateness, and
for trust and prudence.
The evidence from all these domains suggests that people,
including children, participate in social–physical encounters as
engagedpartners, intending to learn about theworld, about others,
and about themselves in a way that allows them to act appropri-
ately and effectively. In these encounters people pay close attention
to the embodied location of themselves and others in judging the
worth of testimony by others and in deciding what they them-
selves should say and do. Furthermore, they show considerable
sensitivity to historical patterns: people who have indicated their
interest and care previously, and who have provided accurate and
useful guidance in the past, are accorded greater deference than
those who have been less caring and accurate, or are unknown.
Overall, adults and children show considerable sophistication in
their ability to integrate information from a variety of sources over
time in ways that are appropriate to their immediate physical and
social well-being, but that also gives promise of their being able
to continue to learn about their social and physical locations and
obligations.
The larger picture that emerges is that people are less concerned
about predicting and controlling than they are in understanding
theworld, others, themselves, andhow they all ﬁt together. The evi-
dence that has been reviewed suggests that people’s actions reveal
that they are seeking somethingmore comprehensive and complex
than most theories of conformity and imitation can countenance.
Much of the burden of this article has been to show that divergence
is far more common and powerful than social and developmen-
tal psychologists have acknowledged. When truth is on the line,
adults and children defend it against majorities and models that
would lead them astray. Nevertheless, across all these domains
children and adults show themselves to be sensitive to the worth
of others’ perspectives and the need to acknowledge that worth.
In the sharpest dilemmas, the diversity of action and choice is
considerable, but it indicates that people generally work to ﬁnd
some accommodation that maintains social, physical, and moral
integrity.
Finally, children and adults rarely act as if they are Cartesian
thinkers, trying to ﬁgure out the world on their own. They show
ample evidence of being guided by others, but they show a lim-
ited appetite for following others blindly or completely. Rather
than being independent learners or conformist imitators, they act
selectively and prudently to be faithful to the world, to their own
perceptions and actions in it, as well as to the perceptions and
actions of others. They seem to be looking for a larger, richer
understanding that holds these together.
This search can be characterized as a dialog, a conversation
among self, others, and the world. Theory and research on conver-
sations and dialog have tended to emphasize alignment: speakers
converge on vocabulary, pronunciation, syntax, and many other
aspects of language as they talk together. This has led to claims that
alignment is necessary to be able to predictwhat others’will say and
to control one’s own replies (Pickering and Garrod, 2013). This
is the same impulse that has allowed psychologists to minimize
divergence and selectivity in conformity and imitation. Fusaroli
et al. (2012) observed that people who are conversing engage in
selective alignment; in fact, they noted that indiscriminate align-
ment undermined effective performance on the task. Although,
it is rarely noted, speakers diverge as much as converge when it
comes to what they say and how they say it, varying on virtually
every dimension measured by linguists (Strigul, 2009). Perhaps,
the most profound fact about dialog is that “it is the things that
we cannot predict that are the most important parts of conver-
sation. Otherwise, it is hard to see why we should speak at all”
(Howes et al., 2013, p. 359). It is the larger, richer dialog of con-
vergence and divergence that is needed for language, learning, and
life to continue. Perhaps, what is most needed for researchers and
theorists is to be surprised once again by the dynamics of this
dialog.
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